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MODERNITY AND THE LAW:
A LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY VIEW
ROBERT P. BURNS*
I intend here to explore Roberto Unger’s understanding of the particular
situation modernity presents for the law. Unger sets his account of modern law
within a broad historical and philosophical context that will help us explore in
detail the significance of important developments in our procedural law that
have occurred in the forty years since he did the work on which I am focusing.1
He built his account of the relationship between law and modernity around a
number of distinctions. One set of distinctions is among customary law,
bureaucratic law,2 and the “rule of law ideal” that emerged with the modern
European liberal society and which survives in a modified form through our
“postliberal” contemporary world.3 “In the broadest sense law is simply any
recurring mode of interaction among individuals and groups, together with the
more or less explicit acknowledgment” of the legitimacy of the reciprocal
expectations that these interactions occasion.4 If law does not go beyond this, it
is what Unger calls “customary or interactional law” which combines factual
regularity with a “sentiment of obligation and entitlement” that identifies
“established forms of conduct with the idea of a right order in society and in the
world at large.”5 Though dominant in premodern societies, customary law
persists as a background to the other forms of legality in various ways,
controlling areas that more explicit law does not reach and sometimes offering
substantive standards, such as the various “reasonable man” notions. Custom
obviously “lacks the attribute of positiveness: it is made up of implicit standards
of conduct rather than of formulated rules” and tends to apply narrowly rather
than “to very general classes.” It also resists being “reduced to a set of rules; to
codify them is to change them.”6
Beyond customary law, there is “bureaucratic or regulatory law” which is
public and positive and arises only “in situations in which the division between
state and society has been established and some standards of conduct have
assumed the form of explicit prescriptions, prohibitions, or permissions

*

William W. Gurley Professor of Law, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law.
The next step would be to link Unger’s account of law with other, more comprehensive
understandings of modernity, such as Charles Taylor’s. See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF:
THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY (1989). Unger’s thought has, of course, continued to develop
in the intervening decades. I have been critical of some of those developments. See Robert P. Burns, When
the Owl of Minerva Takes Flight at Dawn: Radical Constructivism in Social Theory, in CRITIQUE AND
CONSTRUCTION: ESSAYS ON A SYMPOSIUM ON UNGER’S POLITICS (Robin Lovin & Michael Perry, eds.,
1990).
2
Perhaps “bureaucratic rule” would be more accurate, in that he includes with “bureaucratic law”
rule by specific decrees and orders as well as through rules. For Unger’s earlier treatment of bureaucratic
order, see ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 170-74 (1975).
3
Id.
4
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARDS A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL
THEORY 49 (1976) [hereinafter LMS].
5
Id.
6
Id. at 50.
1
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addressed to more or less general categories of persons and acts.”7 It is
“deliberately imposed by government rather than spontaneously produced by
society.”8 Here, the state appears at least nominally to define the relative powers
of groups in a subordinated society, though one or more of those groups may
actually dominate the state itself. This law is bureaucratic in that it “belongs
peculiarly to the province of centralized rulers and their specialized staffs.”9 It
is the medium through which the will of the sovereign, originally princely but
then in some places democratic, can be enforced.10 Bureaucratic law has always
been at least somewhat limited by custom and sometimes by bodies of sacred
law presided over by priestly castes.11 The state becomes essential once
conflicting social groups appear, though it harbors a central paradox:
Only an entity that somehow stands above the conflicting
groups can both limit the power of all the groups and pretend to
the posture of impartiality, impersonality, to providential
harmony which sanctions its claim to their allegiance. The state,
which is the child of the social hierarchy, must also be its ruler;
it must be distinct from any one social group in the system of
domination and dependence. Yet it has to draw its staff and its
purposes from groups that are part of this system. Whenever
either side of the paradox is forgotten, the true relationship
between state and society is forgotten, the true relationship
between state and society is obscured.12
A condition for the emergence of bureaucratic law is what Unger calls “the
disintegration of community[,]” by which he means only that some important
number of its members feel “increasingly able to question the rightness of
accepted practices as well as to violate them[,]” a condition that inheres in all
concretely imaginable non-voluntary modern communities.13
Bureaucratic law is “the device by which the state manipulates social
relations” and “a tool of the power interests of the group that control the state.”14

7

Id. at 51.
Id.
9
Id. See also ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 88–102 (3rd ed. 2007) (emphasizing, in a way
that Unger does not, the centrality of the applied social sciences to the contemporary bureaucrat’s claim
to authority). See also JASON BLAKELY, ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, CHARLES TAYLOR, AND THE DEMISE
OF NATURALISM 15–20 (2016) (describing how the nature of that claimed expertise changed as the
bureaucracy ceased to claim to speak for a unified national identity and presented itself as mediating
among self-interested groups).
10
See ROBERT P. BURNS, KAFKA’S LAW: THE TRIAL AND AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 65–71
(2014) (The mass democratic exercise of sovereignty need not always be more benign.); id. at 65–71. See
also JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2009).
11
The distinction between the prince’s bureaucratic law and a sacred space that he cannot with
impunity invade is as old as Sophocles’ Antigone.
12
LMS, supra note 4, at 60–61 (linking the need for bureaucratic law with greater divisions of labor
and social stratification in more developed societies that raise the level of conscious “apartness” from
others). Id. at 63–64.
13
Id. at 58.
14
Id. at 64, 158 (Bureaucratic law has often coexisted with some realm of “sacred, super positive
order.”). Id. at 158.
8
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As such, it is likely to be viewed in purely instrumental terms. But its legitimacy
often depended on satisfying “the need of rulers and the governed alike to justify
the structure of society by relating it to an image of social and cosmic order”
rather than simply relying on the terror with which the order is imposed.15 If it
is simply the tool of the holders of state power, it can be changed whenever the
rulers choose.16 If not, it gains permanence, but loses some of its flexible
instrumental character. This form of law contains tensions that will lead to the
emergence of yet another form of law, the modern European rule of law ideal.
The modern rule of law ideal will turn out to have significant discontinuities
with the bureaucratic order, but important continuities as well. It emerges in
stages. Its precondition is a “liberal society,” a pluralist or interest group social
order. No one group dominates or can plausibly claim an inherent right to rule
or be accepted as the natural order of things. In a bureaucracy, rules are useful
simply “as a generality of political experience,” to allow the higher bureaucrats
to control the behavior of their subordinates.17 “[T]here are no commitments to
generality in lawmaking and to uniformity in adjudication that must be kept
regardless of the political interests of the rulers.”18 A liberal society thus cries
out for a legal order:
This way of organizing and perceiving society has
revolutionary implications for law. Liberal society cannot
resolve its problem of social order through the mere imposition
of bureaucratic law; it is a form of life in which no one group is
able to command for long the loyalty and the obedience of all
other groups. Thus, it becomes important to devise a system of
law whose content somehow accommodates antagonistic
interests and whose procedures are such that most everyone
might find it in his own interest to subscribe to them regardless
of the ends he happens to seek.19
The opposing tensions can lead to the “creation of a legal order with the
attributes of generality and autonomy.”20 Rules and procedure can then claim

15

Id. at 65.
The apex of this kind of instability actually occurred during the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth
century. There, “all laws have become laws of movement” as “decree followed decree” and all stability
disappeared. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 463 (New Edition with Added
Prefaces, 1973) (The apex of this kind of instability actually occurred during the totalitarian regimes of
the twentieth century.). See also DAVID GRAEBER, THE UTOPIA OF RULES: ON TECHNOLOGY, STUPIDITY
AND THE SECRET JOYS OF BUREAUCRACY 195 (2015) (“Even on the lowest levels, those who enforce
the law are not really subject to it. It’s extraordinary [sic] difficult, for instance, for a police officer to do
anything to an American citizen that would lead to that officer’s being convicted of a crime.”).
17
Id.
18
LMS, supra note 4, at 67.
19
Id. at 69. This system will be pulled in opposing directions. Those pleased with the status quo will
want it preserved, while those less advantaged may see in the legal order an opportunity to oppose the
social status quo or the exercise of bureaucratic power. This descriptive formulation parallels Rawls’
normative liberal account of the distribution of primary goods, scarce goods everyone wants regardless
of what else they want, behind a veil of ignorance as to their ultimate position in society. See also JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 90–95 (1971). (Of course, the creation of the institutions that support the
rule of law did not occur behind a veil of ignorance).
20
Id.
16
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“to represent, over the long run, that universal interest which consists in the
accommodation of all particular interests.”21 The interpretation of these laws by
specialized institutions, staffed by a relatively independent professional group,
steeped in its own craft and techniques of argument seems to ensure that those
the legal order seeks to control will not use it as a tool to pursue their own private
interests. Though the prince and the bureaucracy begin on the same side (though
can come to have divergent interests), both may view the independent legal order
with suspicion. And so, the legal order has been historically rare. For example,
merchant groups throughout Europe preferred their own rules and tribunals.
“Only in modern Europe did the breakthrough occur that made it possible to fuse
the two bodies of law,” the merchants’ rule and the bureaucratic law of the state,
“into a legal order that is different from both its parents.”22
The rule of law emerged, then, from a compromise among “monarchic
bureaucracy, aristocratic privilege, and middle class interest.” No one group was
wholly pleased with it:
Rulers had to sacrifice a parcel of their discretion and the
aristocracies and the third estates a measure of their desired
independence from government. Through this reciprocal
conciliation and surrender, the legal order was born. When we
study the events that produced legal systems in Europe—the
struggles between courts and ministries, between juristic
technique and remorseless statecraft, between efforts to submit
government to society or to subject the latter to the former—we
encounter the signs and stages of this process. For all parties
concerned, the rule of law, like life insurance and like
liberalism itself, was an attempt to make the best of a bad
situation.23
Unger argues as well that some vague notion of natural law was important
for the emergence of the rule of law ideal in early modernity. Like customary
law, natural law merged fact and value and was not a creature of human
deliberation, but it differed from custom “in the generality of its formulation, in
the universality of its alleged scope of application, and in the scholarly or
religious character of the authority upon which it is based.”24 The natural law
notion supports the idea that law “ought to have a measure of critical
independence from politics and custom” and so “requires specialized
institutions, occupational groups, and modes of discourse.”25 It also gave rise to

21

LMS, supra note 4, at 69–70.
Id. at 74. See also Emily Kadens, The Medieval Law Merchant: The Tyranny of a Construct, 7 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 251 (2015) (disputing the existence of a merchants’ law truly independent from the
state).
23
Id. at 75–76 (emphasis added).
24
Id. at 76. See also Alasdair MacIntyre, Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy: Rules, Virtues, and
Goods, in THE MACINTYRE READER, 136–152 (Kelvin Knight ed. 1998) (MacIntyre emphasizes the
continuity between at least Aristotelian-Thomistic natural law and the “intuitive” judgments of ordinary
people.).
25
LMS, supra note 4, at 80. See also EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE “HIGHER LAW” BACKGROUND OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2008).
22
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the essentially contested26 notion of equality before the law: “[o]nly in the
modern West did a system of law develop that assigned duties and entitlements
to individuals regardless of their social rank.”27 The importance of the natural
law notion to the emergence of the modern rule of law creates a central issue for
contemporary societies: “[c]an the ideals of autonomy and generality in law
survive the demise of the religious beliefs that presided over their birth?”28 And
is an autonomous legal order, committed to some notion of generality, or
equality before the law, a mere “transitory characteristic” of societies where the
divine and the political orders are separated?29 These are not wholly speculative
questions.
It was, then, the unique and fortuitous combination of natural law ideas and
a liberal social order that created the notion of a legal order reflecting the rule of
law. The former initially suggested the merger of moral or religious ideas and
the legal world, not, however, the autonomy of the latter from the former. A
purely liberal ideal, however, suggests resolving individual problematic
situations either by ad hoc bargaining or bureaucratic pressure unrestrained by
the formalities that may protect the interests of those out of power. The modern
notions of natural right and the related theory of “public natural law”30 conceded
the existence of norms superior to state power, but reflected modern pluralism
by conceiving of “natural rights as powers of the individual to act within a sphere
of absolute discretion.”31 The synthesis would come under pressure because of
the inherent tensions within it. The natural law background suggested
inalienable and legally protected rights resistant to any claim of expedience,
while the pluralist and interest group background suggested balancing and an
ideal of law reflecting the flexibility and the usual devotion of bureaucratic
ordering to efficiency.32 This is the institutional version of the tension between

26
LMS, supra note 4, at 81 (That equality could remain an abstract equality of equal treatment or
give rise to a demand for substantive equality, which would, in turn, require that “one would have to treat
people who are in different situations differently.” Id. at 81. In the liberal West, the former interpretation
obviously dominated.).
27
Id. at 85.
28
Id. at 83. See also TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 519–21 (Charles Taylor tends to doubt that some of
the aspects of modernity that had Christian origins can survive the loss of the religious foundation.). See
also HANNAH ARENDT, HANNAH ARENDT: THE RECOVERY OF THE PUBLIC WORLD 313–14 (1979).
Hannah Arendt was even more direct in her claim that whole “totalitarian catastrophe would not have
happened if people had still believed in god, or in hell rather—that is if there still were ultimates.” Her
general project was, however, to see many important public institutions as self-grounding, not needing a
transcendent foundation.
29
LMS, supra note 4, at 83.
30
Unger cites LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1950), who sharply distinguishes
modern natural right from classic natural right.
31
LMS, supra note 4, at 85. See also TAYLOR, supra note 1 (This is similar to Taylor’s view of the
distinctiveness of modern natural right compared to classic conceptions of natural law which broadly
imposed obligations rather than underwriting permissions for discretionary action. Unger mentions that
this coheres nicely with a view of the legal order as a system of conflict resolution.).
32
This issue arises in the context of the theory of procedure, perhaps most commonly in debates
surrounding the appropriateness of class actions. Some scholars argue that there are certain procedural
rights of such transcendent significance, usually the right to control the direction of the litigation or to be
heard individually, that they can never be balanced against the practical efficiency of the procedural
device to provide at least some redress. For a critique of those views, see Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to
Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U.L. REV. 485
(2003).
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Kantian notions of right and utilitarian balancing that still characterizes
academic philosophy and public moral argumentation in the United States.
Lon Fuller famously expanded what he understood as the rule of law ideal
to include nine canons that constituted the inner morality of law. These were
generality, publicity, clarity, consistency, feasibility, constancy,33
prospectivity,34 and congruence.35 Fuller made a number of controversial claims
about his canons. The term “inner morality” implied that these were moral rather
than, or in addition to, analytical requirements. He made the related claims that
these features of enactments were “constitutive rules,” so that without observing
the canons, provisions would not be law at all and that they thus constituted
“procedural natural law,” controlling legislation and administration.36 Finally,
he made the claim, which goes considerably beyond Unger’s genetic account,
that law so understood will “enhance human dignity.”37 David Luban concludes
that the rule of law ideal certainly does not wholly prevent oppressive
government, but that it “does deprive governments of some of their favorite
devices of intimidation, namely, vague laws, secret laws, retroactive law, and
confusing and inconsistent laws, all of which are used to keep citizens cautious
and fearful.”38 Fuller’s argument, however, goes beyond this.
Fuller distinguishes, as Unger does, between law and what Fuller calls
“managerial directives,”39 which are basically orders directed to a specific
person requiring or prohibiting a specific act. Of course, any functioning
contemporary legal order will employ both, as bureaucratic rule always did, and
the relationships between them can be enormously complex. Yet, Fuller
maintains “governance through general rules by itself implies ‘a certain built-in
respect for human dignity’ that managerial direction presumably lacks.”40 He
argues that laws, however coercive, do not directly order men to do anything.
Rather they recognize that a person is a “self-determining agent,” for whom law
provides “baselines” that he can then integrate into his decisions.41 General rules
cannot, without infinite regress, provide rules for their own application and they
cannot identify all possible exception prior to their application. The citizen
himself must then interpret the rule as a member of the same community to
which the legislators belong. It is the background understandings of that
community, what Fuller calls “implicit law,” that provide the range of plausible

33
By “constancy,” Fuller meant resistance to rapid change. LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW
(1969) [hereinafter Lon 1964].
34
Prospectivity would exclude ex post facto laws. Id.
35
This requires a close relationship between the law as originally stated and as applied. See David
Luban, The Rule of Law and Human Dignity, 2 HAGUE J. RULE L. 29 (2010); DAVID LUBAN, Natural
Law as Professional Ethics: A Reading of Fuller, in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 99–130 (2007).
36
For a critical assessment by a prominent legal positivist, see Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its
Virtue, 95 L. Q. REV. (1977).
37
Id. at 3. Unger seems to concede that the rule of law does protect human freedom in many contexts,
though especially by protecting individuals and groups against state power. Luban concludes that “the
conception of human dignity at work in Fuller’s claims is too thin to be accepted.” Id. at 4. In particular,
Luban concludes that Fuller has too libertarian a notion of the relationship of the law to the citizen and,
in the terms I am using here, too small a place of the benign place of bureaucratic law in contemporary
society.
38
Id. at 10.
39
Lon 1964, supra note 33, at 207.
40
Luban, supra note 35, at 12.
41
Id.
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interpretations for any rule. And the rule of law ideal trusts citizens to execute
their own rational life plan into which they integrate the requirements of the
law.42 Luban concludes, however, as does Unger, that the “rule of law as a law
of rules” manifests only a weak form of respect for the person. This
conceptualization is compatible with “social relationships marked by radical
subordination of one person by another,” and “[p]rivate oppression, domestic
violence, workplace exploitation, and radical inequality are evils that legal
autonomy will not cure.”43 Bureaucracy, what Luban calls “state intrusion,” can
“protect people as well as oppress people, and decent states will intervene to
establish the conditions in which people can live in dignity . . .”44
Because of its centrality to modernity’s self-understanding, Unger tells us,
“[t]he transformations of law provide a viewpoint from which to survey the
panorama of modernity[.]”45 In liberal society, “every individual belongs to a
large number of significant groups, but each of these groups affects only a
limited part of his life.”46 The whole person is never manifested in any one
context. Because individuals interact in impersonal contexts like markets and
bureaucracy, formal equality and impersonal respect replace tribal solidarity,
though never completely. Perceived mutual advantage eventually replaces a
common vision of the good: “As interest association replaces community
solidarity, the basis for seeing social arrangements as expressions of the good,
the beautiful, or the holy collapses” and “the main puzzle of social thought [is]
that order can prevail despite this diversity.”47
Until the rise of a liberal order, the prince’s commands could be addressed
to a single person or to the entire realm; the modern distinction between
legislation and administration was nonexistent. Generality was an accidental
characteristic, rather than an essential requirement of law. Likewise, in premodern Europe, the contrast between administration and adjudication hardly
existed. This distinction, which assigned to adjudication distinct institutions,
methods of discourse, and occupational groups, was designed to “protect the
authoritative interpretation of law, as a sphere of rule-determined decisions,
from politics, as a realm of prudential judgments.”48 As princely power grew,

42
See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Rawls counts the ability to have a
rational life plan, along with the ability to subject one’s behavior to moral norms, as one of the elements
of personhood.
43
Luban, supra note 35, at 13.
44
Id. Luban notes the importance of lawyers in blunting bureaucratic state power (for good or for ill)
and in many contexts creating (private) law. Fuller is unique among legal philosophers in making lawyers
central players in the legal order. He concludes that he fails to appreciate sufficiently lawyers’ role in
counseling compliance with the law where state enforcement cannot be universal and the importance of
distribution of legal services. And he notes the tension between the independence that a market-based
legal profession has and a fair distribution of legal services.
45
LMS, supra note 4, at 136.
46
Id. at 143.
47
Id. at 146.
48
Id. at 161. In the early modern period, the central bureaucratic power was limited not by the
generality of rules, but by the privileges of the estates. The law governing estate privileges had only “the
beginnings of a commitment to generality and autonomy,” but not to formal equality or specialized legal
institutions. The law of the estates provided only the germ of the notion of a fundamental law preceding
politics and limiting bureaucratic power. The French revolution’s assertion of “omnipotent popular
sovereignty introduced a rival tradition of constitutionalism.” Id. at 164. For the American version of
popular sovereignty, see GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1789
(1971). The American version always stood in tension with the “higher law” background to constitutional
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the aristocracy and the third estate remained sufficiently powerful to insist that
it be subject to preexistent laws, “addressed to broadly defined categories of
persons and acts.”49 This development led to the establishment of an independent
judiciary “to oversee the administrative use of legislation,” as Unger strikingly
described it, in a manner detailing the vision embedded in American
administrative law since the Administrative Procedure Act.50 Liberal
constitutionalism provided one path to the control of bureaucratic state power,
in part through the rule of law ideal. It was, again, aided by the “belief in a Godgiven natural order,” and came to be embodied in the expectation that
preexisting laws have “the trappings of generality and autonomy” and become
“public and positive”:
In the broadest sense, the rule of law is defined by the
interrelated notions of neutrality, uniformity, and predictability.
Governmental power must be exercised with the constraints or
rules that apply to ample categories of person and acts, and
these rules, whatever they may be, must be uniformly applied.
Thus understood, the rule of law has nothing to do with the
content of legal norms.51
Unger argues that it proved not enough that the various groups that exist in
liberal society live at peace that is a balance of terror; the organization of society
must be seen as legitimate, even in the absence of the claims of naturalness that
characterize traditional societies. This is a major challenge: a “defining attribute
of liberal society” is “its tendency to destroy the foundations of the idea that
what ought to be somehow inheres in what is.”52 This is true especially if
“[e]stablished practices . . . are to be approached in the manipulative,
instrumental fashion which the liberal style of interest association implies”53 so
that “whatever consensus does persist in liberal society seems groundless.”54
The “hermeneutic of suspicion,” to use Ricoeur’s term, is the lens through which
existing inequalities and the public institutions themselves come to be seen. Our
practices can be seen not as reflecting an implicit order in society but “as the
products of the very forms of rankings they are used to justify.”55 In one of
Unger’s most famous phrases, a pervasive moral skepticism produces a “sense
of being surrounded by injustice without knowing where justice lies.”56
The judge becomes a central figure in liberal society because it is he who
ensures that an administrator, who deals with individuals, actually is confined

law, broadly rooted in the Declaration of Independence. For an attempt to reconcile the themes, see
HANNAH ARDENT, ON REVOLUTION 191–93 (1977) (particularly, her emphasis on the often-ignored
words “We hold” in “We hold these truths to be self-evident. . .”).
49
LMS, supra note 4, at 50.
50
Id. at 163. Unger argues that “bureaucratic absolutism” came to prevail in Prussia’s version of a
non-democratic version of a liberal society, in contrast to England’s path of parliamentary
constitutionalism.
51
Id. at 176.
52
Id. at 169.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 170.
55
Id. at 173.
56
Id. at 175.
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by the meaning of the law as determined “by a method different from the
administrative one.”57
The administrator focuses on the most effective means to realize
given policy objectives within the constraints of the law. For
him, rules of law are a framework within which decisions are
made. For the judge, on the contrary, the laws pass from the
periphery to the center of concern; they are the primary subject
matter of his activity. Adjudication calls for distinctive sorts of
arguments, and its integrity demands specialized institutions
and personnel.58
And so “even the narrowest view of the rule of law includes a differentiation
of the procedures of legislation, administration, and adjudication.”59 These are
the distinctions that turn out to be under the greatest pressure, something the
contemporary American legal order amply demonstrates.60
The modern rule of law seeks to achieve the impersonality of power but
does so only partially. First, the “family, the workplace, and the market” contain
forms of power that are not governmental, and so largely are beyond the reach
of the rule of law.61 Second, the assumption that power exercised either by
administrator or judge can be effectively constrained by rules it not completely
accurate. This is, again, only a partial truth:
Rules could ensure the impersonality of administrative power
only if there were indeed a way to determine their meaning
independently of the administrator’s preferences. Thus, the
problem of administrative legality turns into a question of
whether judicial power can be adequately controlled by rules.
Can judges make use of a method that purges their decisions of
personal whim? If we admit that words lack self-evident
reference, that meaning must ultimately be determined by
purpose and context, and that the intent of prior lawmakers is
always more or less incomplete, it becomes doubtful whether a
truly impartial method of judging could ever be fashioned

57
Id. at 177. The suggestion is, in part, that an administrator’s instrumental sensibility will tend to
push past the fair meaning of legislation toward the broader justifications for the statute in a maximizing
manner. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF THE
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 42–53 (1991) (providing an analysis of rulefollowing that gives mandatory rules a force independent from its background justification.).
58
Id. at 177. Unger writes that the account of the rule of law provided focuses on a narrow
understanding rather than a more demanding version that would require lawmaking itself to follow
procedures that all would understand it to be in their own interests, a concept underlying the Rawlsian
veil of ignorance.
59
Id.
60
See Robert P. Burns, Is Our Legal Order Just Another Bureaucracy, 48 LOY. U. L. REV. 413
(2016).
61
LMS, supra note 4, at 180 (emphasis added). Unger’s conclusions have, of course, been under
assault by those who contend there is a straightforward way to determine constitutional and statutory
meaning. In my view, those attempts have achieved relatively little success. Gary Lawson, a dedicated
formalist, finds it a bit of a scandal that there does not exist a consensus on the legitimate methods of
statutory interpretation. See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9–12 (7th ed. 2016).
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within the conditions of liberal society. The sense of the
precariousness of the illegitimacy of consensus makes it
difficult for the judge to find a stable authoritative set of shared
understandings and values upon which to base his
interpretations of the law. Hence, every case forces him to
decide, at least implicitly, which of the competing sets of beliefs
in a given society should be given priority. And it requires him
to rely on an accepted morality that, even if it can be identified,
is increasingly revealed as the product of a social situation itself
lacking in sanctity. To this extent, adjudication aggravates,
rather than resolves, the problem of unjustifiable power.62
Unger then provides an account of the rise and fall of rule formalism in
Germany after 1848, an account about which this Article will say little. One set
of conclusions, however, is relevant to this project. Both the bureaucracy and the
judiciary could, at different times, embrace either a mechanical formalism of
rule-following or greater discretionary power. That distinction need not provide
the dividing line between agency and court. And specifically, the fall of
formalism in the Weimar years “brought judges’ reasoning closer in style and
method to the instrumental rationality of the administrative bureaucracy.”63 And
“[t]he basic impulse of top bureaucrats remains everywhere and always the
same: to ensure maximum leeway for their own instrumental rationality and to
limit the discretion of other groups.”64
England’s parliamentary constitutionalism embraced a more central role for
the rule of law, which was “both a cause and effect of the direct participation of
the middle classes in government.”65 But Unger draws a general conclusion from
the German example: “The mere commitments to generality and autonomy in
law and to the distinction among legislation, administration, and adjudication
have no inherent democratic significance.”66
Unger argues that within modernity, liberal societies are followed by
postliberal societies, whose characteristics “undermine the rule of law” and
“ultimately discourage reliance on public and positive rules as bases of social
order.”67 Because the rule of law is “the soul of the modern state[,]” study “of
the legal system takes us straight to the central problems faced by the society
itself.”68 People become conscious that “society consists of a constellation of
governments,” rather than the liberal vision of “association of individuals held
together by a single government.”69 As the government becomes a welfare state,
the social hierarchies that always existed under the liberal rule of law become an
object of political debate and the state becomes involved in the “tasks of overt
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redistribution, regulation, and planning.”70 The law comes to rely on “openended standards and general clauses in legislation, administration, and
adjudication” as it determines which contracts are unconscionable, what is
unjust enrichment, what markets are competitive, and whether an agency has
acted in the public interest.71 Similarly, legal reasoning turns:
[F]rom formalistic to purposeful or policy-oriented styles of
legal reasoning and from concerns with formal justice to an
interest in procedural and substantive justice … An idea of
justice is formal when it makes the uniform application of
general rules the keystone of justice or when it establishes
principles whose validity is supposedly independent of choices
among conflicting values. It is procedural when it imposes
conditions on the legitimacy of the processes by which social
advantages are exchanged or distributed. It is substantive when
it governs the actual outcome of distributive decisions or of
bargains.72
The ideal of formal justice assumes at least the possibility of formalistic
legal reasoning,73 while procedural and substantive ideals envision an overt
choice by the court among competing values.74 Postliberal societies tend to
oscillate between relatively short periods in which formalistic, procedural, or
substantive ideals dominate.75 The latter makes more sense as the state attempts
to address concentrated power in the private sector and to qualify the negative
consequences of mechanical jurisprudence. The administrative state will address
increasingly complex issues where the helpfulness of general rules run out and
the administrator or judge will have to individualize the meaning of broader
principles or standards on a case by case manner.76 The explanation for these
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developments is, to some extent, obscure. They involve a kind of nominalism
about common linguistic categories and the legitimacy of existing distributions,
leading to consequentialist evaluations of governmental activity. Unger will
eventually say that “[t]he welfare trend in postliberal society moves the rules of
law back in the direction of bureaucratic law.”77
Unger’s account of the discontinuity between the implicit claim of the legal
order to act impartially and the claim of bureaucratic law to act in the public
interest and the underlying multiplicity of interests in many ways parallels
Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of the inevitably strained and unprincipled
policies in any modern state. MacIntyre is notoriously unenthusiastic about
modern pluralism. The notion that “political authority is justified in so far as it
provides a secure social order within which individuals may pursue their own
particular ends, whatever they are[,]” a “conception at once individualist and
minimalist,” is dangerous, because it will be rational to be a free rider and
because this kind of society may not “provide adequate justification for the kind
of allegiance that a political society must have from its members, if it is to
flourish.”78 He ends his account in After Virtue with a stark dichotomy between
a traditional society structured by Aristotelian internal norms or one ruled solely
by the will to power. In other essays, he has argued that our society is in essence
the latter and that Aristotelian principles are unavailable to us.79
MacIntyre is impressed as well by the “exceptional degree of
compartmentalization” imposed by the structure of advanced Western
countries.80 One consequence is that “norms governing activities in any one area
are specific to that area.”81 Thus a “[c]ompartmentalized society imposes a
fragmented ethics.”82 His broader view of modern societies draws out the
consequences for the character of politics of Unger’s agonistic view of politics:
Modern states retain the allegiance of those heterogeneous,
overlapping and sometimes competing social groups to which
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their subjects belong by negotiating temporary settlements with
those groups … [They] have to adopt a range of varying and
sometimes incompatible stances, appealing to different and
sometimes incompatible values, here giving market
considerations an overriding value, there denying them this
weight, here accepting governmental responsibility for this or
that aspect of social life, there disowning it, here expressing
respect for custom and tradition, there flouting them in the name
of modernization…A willingness to break promises and to shift
positions has become, not a liability, but one aspect of what in
the social life of modernity is accounted the chief of virtues,
adaptability.83
Political outcomes are “determined by shifting coalitions of interest and
power with the limits set by and for those elites who determine—although not
at all at will—the range of choices confronting governments.”84 There are few
forums in which “substantive issues concerning ways of life” can be debated in
any sustained and serious ways.85 Though, the apparently neutral determinations
of liberal government “undermine some [forums] and promote others.”86
MacIntyre thus concludes that “local arenas are now the only places where
political community can be constructed, a political community very much at
odds with the politics of the nation-state.”87
The autonomy and generality ideals become implausible to the extent that
the range of relevant facts, facts reflecting “numerous and inchoate interests,” is
understood to increase.88 The system faces a Hobson’s choice between an
intuitively attractive flexibility and discretion in applying general standards or
an unattractive “petrification” that reduces standards to rules.89 Purposive legal
reasoning introduces flexibility based on variations in the factual context and the
instrumental means concretely available to achieve the law’s perceived purpose.
“Hence, the very notion of stable areas of individual entitlement and obligation,
a notion inseparable from the rule of law ideal, will be eroded.”90 The attempt to
achieve a refined substantive justice, for example, by expanding the range of
excuses available to a criminal defendant based on “judgments about particular
persons and individual situations,” also will “resist statement as rules.”91 The
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autonomy of the rule of law ideal is likewise eroded by broader standards that
invite invocation of “the technician’s conception of efficiency or the lawman’s
view of justice” and so legal discourse “approaches that of common place
political or economic argument” which is “characterized by the predominance
of instrumental rationality over other modes of thought.”92 “Courts begin to
resemble openly first administrative, then other political institutions” which, in
turn, erodes the difference between lawyers and other bureaucrats or
technicians.”93 All these developments contribute to reducing the appeal of the
distinctive ideals of generality and autonomy in the law.
The rise of the corporate state also serves to qualify the ideals of the rule of
law by effacing the boundaries between “state and society, and therefore
between the public and the private realm.”94 Administrative, corporate, and labor
law “merge into a body of social law that is more applicable to the structure of
private-public organizations than to official conduct or private transactions.”95
Private organizations themselves become more bureaucratized to achieve the
power that bureaucratization confers and allows them to exercise sometimes
“decisive influence over government agencies.”96 And the concrete “[l]aw of
institutions is a law compounded of state-authored rules and of privatelysponsored regulations or practices; its two elements are less and less capable of
being separated.”97 Unger concludes in the speculative hope that the corporatist
and communitarian themes in post-liberalism undermine bureaucratic law and
open the “way for the return to the custom of each group as the fundamental and
almost exclusive instrument of social order.”98
Central to legal modernity, then, is a development away from formalism99
and toward other doctrines more responsive to the ideals of equity and solidarity,
notions the formalist distrusts because liberalism assumes that “all moral
judgments are subjective even if they are widely shared.”100 Purposive legal
interpretation creates an unstable compromise, resolving none of the underlying
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issues. Unger seems to suggest that the tension between formalism and equity
reflect ever-present conflicts within legal traditions, rather than as one specific
to modernity. Unger’s view of procedural justice is largely Weberian, where
that form of justice is an attempt to qualify the results of naked arms-length
bargaining or power politics by strengthening one of the participants, leading to
distributive consequences, though without directly mandating substantively just
outcomes.101 Unger also provides a list of the ways in which basically formal
legal systems may at least nod in the direction of broader moral or political goals.
In particular, “technical legal doctrines developed and applied thought
adjudication”102 probably under the equal protection clause, may have a limited
role in recognizing “both comparative fault and relative need”103 and attacking
the “problem of domination at its core.”104 They implicitly reject modern notions
of the subjectivity of value and “insist on judging the moral quality of social
relations.”105 The continuing appeal of hard law under modern conditions stems
from both unavoidable free-rider problems and a deeper reason: “[i]n modern
society, in which much of religion and morals are seen as prerogatives of
individuals’ conscience, law is the preeminently collective order,” one that can
respect the authority of moral standards over concrete social life.106 Conceding
the Hegelian point that there cannot be too great a discontinuity (though it is
healthy that there be some), between the “modes and motives of ordinary
conduct” and public law, Unger urges that the tension be thought of as within
public law, not in the typically modern imaginary of discontinuity between
private morality and the norms applicable to public institutions.107 Unger then
tells the dark story of the death of formality in Weimar Germany and the “high
risks critical intelligence runs when it attacks the idea of positive law on behalf
of an ideal of self-governing community.”108
There exist, then, a number of questions about the way forward for a modern
postliberal order:
Do these events suggest a return to the near exclusive primacy
of custom? Or do they point the way to a novel kind of
normative order? Do they irremediably compromise
liberalism’s cherished ideals of freedom and of the capacity to
distinguish critically between what ought to be and what is? Or
do they accommodate these ideals with a broader vision that
also embodies the claims of community and of the sense of
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participation in a natural order permeating society and the entire
world?109
Unger envisions two broad possibilities. The first is a kind of contraction of
the historical development he described, in which the rule of law ideal, closely
allied with the notion of individual freedom, and bureaucratic law, associated
with the notion that social arrangements can be understood and changed, both
recede. The former development may threaten individual freedom and may
portend a kind of conservative or tribal fatalism. The other possibility is more
hopeful, perhaps utopian, and envisions an upward spiral in which a higher
reconciliation of conflicting perspectives can take place. Freedom is reconciled
with community, on the one hand, and an understanding that we create our social
world110 is “reconciled with the sense of an immanent order in society.”111
Moving beyond bureaucratic law and the rule of law ideal could occur only after
a number of unlikely developments: a lessening of inequality which would be
the social precondition for an emerging consensus on matters of justice that is
reliably perceived as reflecting a “moral foundation” that is not an ideological
expression of dominant groups. Even such a consensus would have to retain the
openness to the future through its own continual revision through “the
conflictual process by which communities are created over time.”112
Such a reconciliation of immanent order and transcendent
criticism would imply a greater replacement than we could now
comprehend of bureaucratic law or the rule of law by what in a
sense could be called ‘custom.’ This customary law would have
many of the marks we associate with custom: its lack of a
positive and a public character and its largely emergent and
implicit quality. Yet it would differ from custom in making
room for a distinction between what is and what ought to be. It
would become less the stable normative order of a particular
group than the developing moral language of mankind.113
Currently, in post-liberal society, the three kinds of law all exist and
interpenetrate each other. There exists (1) a sphere of blackletter law where the
distinctive conventions of the legal profession dominate, (2) a sphere of
bureaucratic law114 where an administrative elite employs what may fairly be
called policy sciences, and (3) a background that reflects “the inchoate sense of
equity and solidarity.”115 The last, he tells us, in a less unequal society, could be
“the primitive form taken by “the struggle to discover a universal given order in
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social life.”116 In a manner reminiscent of Fuller, he tells us that this is the natural
home of the lawyer:
The search for this latent and living law–not the law of
prescriptive rules or of bureaucratic policies, but the elementary
code of human interaction–has been the staple of the lawyer’s
art wherever this art was practiced with the most depth and skill.
What united the great Islamic ‘ulama’, the Roman jurisconsults,
and the English common lawyers was the sense they shared that
the law, rather than being made chiefly by judges and princes,
was already present in society itself. Throughout history there
has been a bond between the legal profession and the search for
an order inherent in social life. The existence of this bond
suggests that the lawyer’s insight, which preceded the advent of
the legal order, can survive its decline.117
Note that his examples are largely pre-modern, but he is describing here a
future that would occur after modernity’s destructive effects on the rule of law
ideal. And so, this has to be speculation, a projection of perceived trends. It may
turn out that the future remains like the present, a directionless tension among
the legal order, bureaucratic law and custom.
Unger ends by returning to issues of social theory. The “problems of
method, order, and modernity are closely connected.”118 He calls for an
interpretive social science that explains by placing elements of social life within
the meaningful wholes that confer significance to the “logic of situations.”119 He
argues that this is the most appropriate method for the study of law, because “[a]
society’s law constitutes the chief bond between its culture and its organization;
it is the external manifestation of the embeddedness of the former in the
latter.”120 It treads a middle path between behaviorism and idealism. It yields a
view that attempts to synthesize “the doctrine of private interest and consensus,
and hence between the instrumental and non-instrumental view of rules.”121
(The latter focuses on their legitimacy.) The natural home of the latter is
customary law; its theoretical and practical limitation is addressing conflict and
change, where they inevitably occur.
The doctrine of private interest is most applicable to liberal
society, and more generally, to those aspects of modernity
characterized by the antagonism of individual ends and the felt
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illegitimacy of consensus. The social situation it portrays are
those that serve as the settings for an imposed bureaucratic law
or for an allegedly impartial legal order.122
The theories justifying liberalism have difficulty accounting for social
stability and cohesion and liberal societies experience their arrangements as
fragile and sometimes illegitimate. Liberalism is thus “the form of social life that
most depends on impersonal rules, yet it is the one least able to shape and apply
them.”123 When consensus fails, both bureaucratic law and the legal order lack
the resources to address the crisis. That is because both individuality and
sociability of persons are basic attributes of persons that cannot completely be
suppressed. What is the utopian solution? “A society resolves the crisis of order
insofar as it manages to reconcile individual freedom with community cohesion,
and the sense of an immanent order with the possibility of transcendent
criticism.”124
He rejects the account of modernity offered by liberalism, that of “an
association of individuals who have conflicting ends and whose security and
freedom are guaranteed by the rule of law”125 and the competing Marxist account
of class struggle masked by ideology and false consciousness. Liberal modern
society denies “both community and immanent order and is therefore best
described by the doctrine of private interest.”126 Post-liberal modern society,
embodied in the welfare state, is “obsessed … with the reconciliation of freedom
and community.”127
This alliance is part of a broader responsibility; the sense of a
latent natural order in social life must be harmonized with the
capacity to let the will remake social arrangements. To achieve
this reconciliation, and thereby to work toward the ideal of a
universal community, is the great political task of modern
societies.128
Unger ends with a respectful acknowledgement that the great modern social
theorists’ assault on metaphysics, with its speculative illusions, and politics, with
the variation of political judgment, was partially successful. Now, however, the
task is to travel back in the opposite direction: social theory must become both
metaphysical and political. Metaphysical, because to solve its own problems, it
must embrace understandings of knowledge and human nature of which a
rigorously scientific account will never give. He concedes that we do not have
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such a metaphysics.129 Political, because there is inevitably a dialectic between
political events and our social understanding, and description can never be fully
separated from evaluation. We do not yet have such a politics. As Clifford Geertz
put it with regard to explanation: insight comes from a “continuous dialectical
tacking between the most local of local detail and the most global of global
structures in such a way as to bring them both into view simultaneously.”130
Unger puts it this way: “For surely it is true of social theory as of other branches
of knowledge that the deepest insight is likely to be gained when one is in
passage from a more general to a more particular perception, or from the
particular to the general.”131
Unger has set out a global account of modern law and linked the most
dramatic features of contemporary law to the social background and to the
intertwined philosophical issues. He demonstrates the appeal of legal formalism
in a liberal, interest group world, the pervasive limitations of its claim to
autonomy from the underlying political conflicts, and the dangers inherent in its
decline. He shows how the second coming of bureaucratic law132 is rooted in the
limitations of formalism. Finally, Unger provides a picture of modernity
characterized by a pervasive belief in the subjectivity of value intertwined with
a pluralism of social groups and interests. He ends with an argument that only a
transformed politics and a not yet existent metaphysics would provide the way
forward.
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